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ADIMIRALTY-SALVAGE OF ONE GOVERNMENT VESSEL BY ANOTHER.-A govern-
ment tug was chartered at the usual rate of $25.oo an hour to tow The Olockson,
a United States Shipping Board vessel which was on fire, into shoal water and
sink her. The Olockson had been abandoned by her master and crew. After
permission was secured from the Marine Superintendent to attempt to save the
vessel, the captain and crew of the tug through highly meritorious service suc-
ceeded in getting The Olockson into port where the cargo and vessel, worth nearly
$3oo,coo, was saved. The members of the tug's crew brought this suit in
admiralty for salvage. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff could
recover an award of $15,ooo. The Olockson (1922, C. C. A. 5th) 281 Fed. 690.
A claim for salvage must contain the following elements: (i) a marine peril
to the property rescued; (2) service voluntarily rendered when not required
as an existing duty or by special contract; (3) success in whole or in part.
Mfanchester Liners Ltd. v. United States (1918) 53 Ct.'Cl. Rep. 449; 35 Cyc. 720.
Since an award for salvage is given because of the desirability of compensating
extraordinary and voluntary services rendered at sea in time of peril, it is
immaterial that both vessels are under the same ownership. See, Act of August
I, 1912 (37 Stat. at L. 242) ; Gilchrist Tralnsp. Co. v. Northern Wheat (19o3,
W. D. N. Y.) 12o Fed. 432. Nor does the fact that both are owned by the
government prevent a recovery. Jacobsen v. Panama Ry. (1920, C. C. A. 2d)
266 Fed. 344; Rees v. United States (19o4, N. D. Calif.) 134 Fed. 146. A more
difficult problem would arise if both vessels were battleships. The test of
whether or not the acts performed were in line of duty would probably be
applied. See The Ulysses (1888, C. A.) 6o L. T. R. (N. s.) ii. The view in
the dissenting opinion was that the service rendered was covered by the express
contract. As the work was of such a dangerous character, however, that the
tug would have been. privileged to refuse to perform the contract such a view
cannot be supported. For a further discussion of the law of salvage see (1921)
30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 757.
ATTACHMENTS-CONVERSION OF SECURITIES-ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
FRAuD-The defendant rehypothecated stocks which the plaintiff had pledged
with him for a debt larger than that which they secured and upon tender was
unable to return them. The plaintiff levied an attachment on the defendant's
property under a statute permitting such a levy where the defendant "fraudu-
lently contracted the debt or'incurred the obligation respecting which the action
is brought'" Bagby's Ann. Md. Code, 1911, art. 9, sec. 36. Held, that the
unlawful conversion -was a "debt fraudulently contracted" within the meaning
of the statute. Turner & Thomas v. Schwarz (1922, Md.) 117 Atl. 904.
By the great weight of authority a rehypothecation of securities by the pledgee
to secure a larger debt than that for which they were pledged to him is a con-
version. Sproul v. Sloan (1913) 241 Pa. 284, 88 AtI. 5o. Statutes limiting
attachments to claims arising on contract are generally construed to include
quasi-contractual claims, so that the tort may be waived and the suit-considered
as arising from an "implied" contract. State v. Superior Court (igIg) 105 Wash.
676, 178 Pac. 827. To sustain the attachment, there must be an actual intent to
defraud on the part of the debtor. Fidelity Co. v. Johnston (19o6) 117 La. 88o,
42So:357. The term "fraud" covers a species of wrong involving moral turpitude
and may be defined as any unfair means used with the express intention of
deceiving another. Thus, in the action of deceit it is necessary to prove a
representation known to be false and made with the specific' intention that it be
acted on. Kountze v. Kennedy (1895) 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414; Pollock,
Torts (iith ed. 1920) 281. A negligent misrepresentation is not sufficient.
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Derry v. Peek (x889, H. L.) 14 A. C. 337. However, if made recklessly it is
equivalent to the requisite scienter. Miller v. John (19o4) 208 III. 173, 7o N. E.
27. By the weight of authority an innocent principal is liable in deceit for the
misrepresentations of his agent. Barwick v. Joint Stock Bank (1867) L. R. 2
Exch. 259; 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) sec. 1995. This, however, is not
an abandonment of the requirement of moral turpitude in the facts constituting
the tort, but rather a necessary incident of the doctrine of respondeat superior
in allocating responsibility. In equity the term "fraud" is made susceptible of
wider application. A person will not be allowed to retain the fruits of a bargain
induced by his innocent misrepresentation. Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart Parr
Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 321, 163 N. W. 665; 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec.
15oo. Equity seeks to relieve from an unjust enrichment and an actual misrepre-
sentation is the essential operative fact, so the term "equitable fraud" may
perhaps be condoned. Again, although an actual intent to defraud is necessary
to invalidate a will, yet if there is an unjust enrichment because of the repudia-
tion of a parol promise on the part of the devisee or legatee, though he had no
fraudulent intent at the outset, a constructive trust exists in favor of intended
beneficiaries. Rood, Wills (19o4) sec. 171; In re Everts Estate (1912) 163
Calif. 449, 125 Pac. io58; Gifford, Will or iMo Will? (192o) 2o CoL L. REV. 862.
A large class of cases is embraced in the loose term "constructive fraud." Where
the consideration for a contract is so inadequate as to shock the conscience, or
where one of the parties is mentally weak or laboring under necessity or pecuni-
ary distress, the court is said to presume fraud in fact, and equity will set aside
the transaction. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) sec. 927; Herzog
v. Gipson (1916) 17o Ky. 325, 185 S. W. iig. But proof of good faith is a
defense. Grimminger v. Alderton (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 425, 96 Atl. So. A breach
of a fiduciary relation by failure to make full disclosure is said to be "construc-
tive fraud": for example, a conveyance of trust property by a trustee to him-
self without knowledge or consent of the cestui que trust is always voidable.
Linsley v. Strang (1910) 149 Iowa, 690, 126 N. W. 941. But, wherever applied,
the term "constructive fraud" is purely a fiction and is only confusing. Smith,
Surviving Fictions (i917.) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 317, 319; cf. Nocton v. Lord
Ashburton [I914, H. L.] A. C. 932; (1915) 31 L. QUART. REV. 93. In view of the
variety of meanings which courts attach to the term "fraud," just what was
intended by the legislature in the instant case becomes a matter of conjecture.
On grounds of policy it seems that, unless the debtor is a non-resident, the
drastic remedy of attachment ought to be confined to cases of actual inala fides.
It is in reality an added security necessary where there is a suspicion that the
debtor will prevent satisfaction of the judgment by concealing his assets. Wade,
Attachments (1887) sec. 8. In the instant case there was sufficient evidence
from both the contract and the custom of the business to warrant a belief by
the defendant that his act was privileged, but in the view of the court "it was not
essential to the validity of the attachment that any fraud or intention to defraud
at the time should have existed." This is opposed to the great weight of author-
ity and is objectionable in its inaccurate interpretation of an important legal
concept. 3o L. R. A. 465, note; Wade, op cit. sec. 98.
BANKRUPTcY-EXEMPT CLASSES-CLAssIFIcATIoN GOVERNED BY OCCUPATION AT
DATE OF ACT OF BANKRUPTcY.The defendant was engaged chiefly in farming
both at the time when an involuntary petition was filed and when the act of
bankruptcy was committed. When the debts were incurred, however, he was a
cashier of a bank as well as a farmer. Held, that the occupation at the time
of committing the alleged act of bankruptcy was decisive, and that the defendant
could not be adjudicated a bankrupt. In re Beiseker & Martin (1921, D. Mont.)
277 Fed. 1OO.
RECENT CASE NOTES 185
Section 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "any natural person except
a wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the
soil .. . . shall be subject to the provisions . . . .of this Act." Act of July I,
1898 (30 Stat. at L. 547). The statute is silent as to the point of time which
shall determine the debtor's occupational status, and as a result the courts have
reached three different conclusions. The first is that the occupation of the
debtor at the time of the filing of the petition governs. .iT re Matson (19o3,
M. D. Pa.) 123 Fed. 743; Hoffschlaeger Co. Ltd. v. Young Nap (1904, U. S.
D. C. Hawaii) 12 Am. Bankr. Cas.-52i. This follows a literal interpretation
of the statute, and adopts the general federal rule as to jurisdiction. See Bank-
ruptcy Act, sec. I (io), supra; Mollan v. Torrance (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 537,
2 Rose's Notes, 8o. It is impractical, however, as it allows a debtor to defeat
the purpose of the Act by changing from a non-exempt to ar exempt occupation
prior to the date of the petition. See In re Disney (1915, D. Md.) 219 Fed.
294. Another test makes the time of the act of bankruptcy the material date.
In re Luchhardt (igo, D. Kan.) ioi Fed. 807; In re Folkstad (1912, D. Mont.)
199 Fed. 363; Harris v. Tapp (1916, S. D. Ga.) 235 Fed. 1918. This construc-
tion renders a change of occupation subsequent to the act of bankruptcy ineffec-
tive, and is usually applied in those cases where the debtor was engaged in the
same occupation both at the time the debts were incurred and at thei-time the
alleged act of bankruptcy was committed. In re Disney, supra; In re Luchhardt,
supra; In re Mackey (19o, D. Del.) 11O Fed. 355. But under certain circum-
stances even this rule, although applied in the majority of cases, operates unjustly,
and some courts apply a third test. Thus, if a debtor changes from a non-
exempt to an exempt occupation immediately prior to the act of bankruptcy,
his occupation at the time when his debts are incurred controls. In re Burgin
(19o9, N. D. Ala.) 173 Fed. 726; In re Wakefield (19io, N. D. Calif.) 182 Fed.
247; Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed Milk Co. (1905, M. D. Pa.) 141 Fed. 444.
The theory of this rule is that the debtor should be estopped from setting up
an exemption assumed with the intent of defrauding his creditors, and it has
been properly limited to those cases where fraud or wrongful intent exist. In
the instant case, therefore, where there was no evidence of fraud on which to
base an estoppel, the court correctly adopted the more general and practical
rule that the date of the act of bankruptcy is decisive.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEnOm OF SPEECH AND OF THE PREsS-CENSORSHIP
OF "CURRENT EVENT" MOTION PicruREs.-The plaintiff, the producer of "Path6
News," a motion picture depicting current events, attacked the constitutionality
of a New York statute (N. Y. Laws, 1921, ch. 715) which provides for the
censorship of all films to be exhibited in the State of New York. Application
was made for a declaratory judgment under the Civil Practice Act, N. Y. C. P. A.
ch. 546. Held, that the statute was constitutional, and that it applied to current
event films. Path Exrchange, Inc. v. Cobb (1922) 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 661.
The freedom to write and publish on all subjects, which is guaranteed by the
state and federal constitutions, has generally been limited only by a liability for
its abuse. Respublica v. Oswald (1788, U. S.) I Dall. 317; Bee Publishing Co.
v. State (1921, Neb.) I85 N. W. 339. The courts have frequently refused to
grant injunctions forbidding the publication of libellous statements. Brandretz
v. Lance (1839, N. Y.) 8 Paige, 23; Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 H.Av. L. Rxv. 64o, 648. The Supreme
Court has, since the World War, shown a greater tendency to permit restric-
tion on the freedom of speech and of the press. Abrams v. United States (igig)
25o U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17; United States v. Burleson (1921) 255 U. S. 407,
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41 Sup. Ct. 352; COMMENTS (I920) 29 YA=E LAW JOURNAL, 337; see Chafee,
Freedom of Speech (192o) ch. 3; Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom
of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Tire (192o) 14
ILL. L. REv. 539. Statutes providing for state censorship of motion pictures
have been uniformly held constitutional. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm.
of Ohio (1914) 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387; Mutual Filmn Co. v. Breitinger
(1915) 250 Pa. 225, 95 AtI. 433. For discussions of the censorship problem, see
Censorship (1921) 46 Survey, 231; Cinema and its Censor (1921) lo9 FORT-
NIGHTLY REVIEW, 222. The exhibition of a person's picture in a "current events"
news reel has been held not to be a violation of a statute prohibiting the use of any
person's name or portrait for trade purposes, upon the theory that "current event"
films are so similar to newspapers that they should be considered as coming
within the "free press" constitutional provisions. Huiiston v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co. (1919) 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752. The rota-
gravure and pictorial sections of modern newspapers approach the current event
film. Apparently a distinction is recognized largely because newspapers are
protected from censorship by historical bulwarks.
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED OBLIGATION TO PAY PHYsIcIAN REQUESTED TO SERVE
THIRD PERSONT.-A child injured by the defendant's truck was carried to the
office of the plaintiff, a physician. There was a conflict in the evidence as to
whether or not the defendant requested the plaintiff to care for the child. It
was admitted that the defendant was under no duty to furnish the child with
necessary medical care. The court charged that the plaintiff might recover if
the defendant had promised to pay or had requested him to attend the injured
child. Held, that the charge, being prejudicial to the defendant, was erroneous.
Fruin v. Glassnap (1922, Conn.) 117 AtI. 547.
A promise to pay the reasonable value of services rendered by a physician
is implied in fact from a request made either by the patient or a third party
who owes a legal duty to the patient to furnish him necessary medical care.
McGuire v. Hughes (1913) 207 N. Y. S16, IO N. E. 46o. No such inference is
drawn, howdver, from a request by one not under a legal duty to the patient.
Meisenbach v. So. Cooperage Co. (1891) 45 Mo. App. 232. Accompanying cir-
cumstances may warrant a finding that there was an implied promise to pay.
Edson v. Hammond (1911) I42 App. Div. 693, 127 N. Y. Supp. 359. The infer-
ence of such a promise is usually for the jury. Raoul v. Newman (1877) 59
Ga. 408. The fact that the request was for services at the defendant's home,
that the defendant gave no indication that he was only a messenger, that the
doctor responded without knowing that it was an accident case and that the
defendant was under no duty to the injured person has been held to warrant
such an inference. Grattop v. Rowheder (19O1) I Neb. (Unof.) 66o, 95 N. W.
679; Foster v. Meeks (I896, Sup. Ct.) 18 Misc. 461, 41 N. Y. Supp. 95o; Raoul
v. Neznan, supra, Similarly where the defendant did not repudiate but objected
to the amount when the bill was rendered to him. Best v.. McAuslan (19o5)
27 R. I. io7, 6o At. 774. A desire to protect doctors has influenced these deci-
sions, but the conflicting desire to foster a willingness in third parties to help
in an emergency has made the courts wary of finding an implied promise.
Mere relationship to the patient or the fact that the defendant makes the request
when the patient is unconscious are not sufficient of themselves to justify an
implication of a promise to pay. Smith v. Watson (1842) 14 Vt. 332; Starrett
v. Miley (1898) 79 Ill. App. 658; see 46 L. R.. A. (N. s.) 577, note. In the
instant case the defendant was not under a legal duty to furnish medical
care to the patient. He did not summon the plaintiff, and the doctor understood
that it was an accident case. A promise to pay, therefore, should not be implied
from a mere request.
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COR'0RATIOs-Nu.LITY OF A CONTRACT MADE BY A COROATION WHICH HAS
FORFEITED ITS CHARTER.-The defendant corporation, during the period of forfei-
ture of its charter under a statute (Calif. Sts., 1917, ch. 215, secs. 3, 9, IZ) con-
tracted with the plaintiff for his services. After the revival of its charter, the
defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to begin performance. The plaintiff
sued for damages. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, since the contract
was void. Van Landingham v. United Tuna Packers (1922, Calif.) 208 Pac. 973.
According to the better reasoned opinions, a corporation, upon forfeiture of
its charter, comes under a disability to receive rights, privileges, or beneficial
powers, but not their opposites, and is liable to suit and judgment. Comstock
v. I. R. Droney Lumber Co. (1911) 69 W. Va. 100, 71 S. E. 255. In the instant
case the corporation was under a disability to contract and, because of the
penalty imposed by the statute, a duty not to contract. "Defunct" corporations
still owe duties to use care and not to convert the property of others. Miller's
Adm'x. v. Newburg Coal Co. (888) 31 W. Va. 836, 8 S. E. 6o0; Dutton Hotel
Co. v. Fitzpatrick (192o) 69 Colo. 229, 193 Pac. 549. Clearly the object of a suit
for the breach of those duties is to reach the corporate funds. But, properly
considered, a corporation's legal relations in regard to its funds are merely
those of the persons of whom it consists. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders'
Individual Liability for Corporation Debts (igog) 9 COL. L. REv. 285, 290.
Hence there seems to be no valid reason why they should escape liability merely
because the contract was in form that of a defunct corporation. Plainly, how-
ever, the stockholders cannot be held as a de facto corporation merely because
they continue to do business after forfeiture, although conceivably, appropriate
action taken under a reviving statute might have that effect. Bird v. Gay (igo)
162 Mich. 612, 127 N. W. 814. On the entity theory, the corporation is dead
and cannot be sued; neither can a non-existent corporation be estopped to deny
its existence. But where the directors of an ostensible corporation are sued
personally they are estopped to deny their-directorship. Council v. Browt (1921)
151 Ga. 564, lO7 S. E. 867; see (1919) 28 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 6o4. If the
stockholders actually authorize the officers or directors to continue to do busi-
ness as though a corporation still exists a similar estoppel might well be raised
against them. The more difficult question of apparent authority arises where
business is carried on after forfeiture without the stockholders' express sanction.
Some cases indicate that the stockholders or directors could then he held as
partners. Cf. Sanders & Walker v. Herndon (igo8) 128 Ky. 437, lo8 S. W. go.;
Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon (1915) 96 Kan. 492, 152 Pac. 765. In any event
the contracting agent could be held for breach of warranty of authority. See
C0 M ENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 248. The instant decision, however,
rests squarely upon the language of the statute. Newhall v. Western Zinc Mining
Co. (1912) 164 Calif. 380, 128 Pac. 104O. The injustice caused could be prevented
by the enactment of a law providing that corporations, defunct by forfeiture of
charter, may acquire duties but not rights; liabilities but not powers.
CORPORATIONs-LBEL AND SLANDER-RIGHT OF THE CORPORATION TO MAINTAIN
AN ACTION FOR LIDrE.-The defendant published a poster defaming the editor
of the plaintiff newspaper, a corporation. The editor was charged with hypoc-
risy, drunkenness, and moral turpitude. The corporation brought an action
for libel. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the corporation could not recover.
Adirondack Record v. Lawrence (1922, N. Y.) 2o2 App. Div. 251.
A corporation may sue for a libel which reflects on the management of its
business or property and which necessarily affects its credit and directly occasions
pecuniary injury. Such a libel is actionable per se. Puget Sound Nav. Co. V.
Carter (1916, D. Wash.) 233 Fed. 832; Reporters' Ass'n. v. Sun (19o6) 186 N. Y.
437, 79 N. E. 710; Coal Land Development Co. vi. Chidester (192o) 86 W. Va.
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561, IO3 S. E. 923; Hapgoods v. Crawford (igo8) 125 App. Div. 856, iiO N. Y.
Supp. i. It necessarily follows that the libel to be actionable per se must be
upon the corporation as distinguished from its individual members. Brayton v.
Police Co. (igoo) 63 Ohio, 83, 57 N. E. IO85; Pa. Iron Works v. Voght Mach.
Co. (igo6) 29 Ky. L. Rep. 861, 96 S. W. 551. Some libels, personal in their nature,
depending on matters which require such a personality as a corporation can
not possess, are not actionable by a corporation. Examples of these are charges
of murder, incest, adultery, or corruption. Manchester v'. Williams [i8g] I
Q. B. 94 (corruption) ; see South Hetton Coal Co. v. N. E. News Assoc. [1894]
I Q. B. 133; Metropolitan Oinnibus Co. v. Hawkins (1859, Exch.) 5 Jur. (N. s.)
2:26 (dicta as to murder, incest, and adultery). For a criticism of this view,
see Bower, A Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation (igo8) 279. Since a
corporation has neither character to be affected nor feeling to be injured it
must allege and prove special damage when its business reputation or property
rights are not injuriously affected. Kemple & Mill v. Kaighn (19o9) 131 App.
Div. 63, 115 N. Y. Supp. 809; Shoe & Leather Bank v. Thompson (1865, N. Y.) IS
Abb. Pr. 413; Memphis T. Co. v. Cumberland T. T. Co. (igo6, C. C. A. 6th)
145 Fed. 904; cf. Riding v. Smith (1876) I Exch. Div. gi. The fact that the
editor, and not the corporation, was defamed, as the poster bore no imputation
that the corporation entrusted the management of the paper to an unfit editor,
justifies the view of the instant case. The acts charged were of such a nature
that they could not have been committed by any other than a natural person;
a corporation can no more be drunk than guilty of adultery or incest. Obviously
the case is in harmony with the authorities.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR SRvcEs-For
three years the plaintiff rendered service in her husband's place of business by
waiting on customers and repairing instruments. She brought an action to
recover upon a quantuz inernit for her services. The defendant demurred on
the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. Held, that the demurrer should be sustained. Dorsett v. Dorsett
(1922, N. C.) Ini S. E. 541.
At common law a wife could not sue her husband; her service and labor
during coverture were the property of her husband. I Blackstone, Co-'nzen-
taries *443; Prescott v. Brown (1843) 23 Me. 305; Hinman v. Parkis (1866) 33
Conn. 188. But the varying interpretations of Enabling Statutes, permitting
actions by the wife against her husband, have thrown the law into some con-
fusion. It is now generally provided that a wife is entitled to wages for services
performed for third parties. N. Y. Cons. Laws, igo9, ch. 14, sec. 6o; Martin v.
Robson (1872) 65 Ill. 129. A wife is under no duty because of the marriage
relation to perform services in her husband's business. Carse v. Reticker (1895)
95 Iowa, 25. Otherwise with reference to household services; hence even an
express contract for compensation is not enforceable because of lack of con-
sideration. Bohanan v. Maxwell (1921) 19o Iowa, 1308, 181 N. W. 683. There
is good consideration for the husband's promise to pay for services in a business
not connected with the home. Nieding v. Urich (1895) 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl. 409;
Roche v. Union Trust Co. (1899, Ind. App.) 52 N. E. 612. But some Enabling
Statutes have been interpreted as not changing the common law rule that any
services that the wife renders for the husband belong to him. N. Y. Laws, i86o,
ch. go, sec. 2; Blaechinska v. Howard Mission (1892) 13o N. Y. 497, 29 N. E.
755. This result has even been obtained where services were rendered to the
husband's firm. Turner v. Davenport (igoo) 6I N. J. Eq. 18, 47 Atl. 766. The
majority view is with the instant decision in cases where there is no express
promise. Overbeck v. Ahlneier (1902) io6 Ill. App. 6o6; contra, In re Cox
(I912, D. N. M.) igg Fed. 952; cf. Smith v. Axe (1894) 14 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 532.
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Since the wife is under no duty to assist her husband in his business and could
recover for a similar service to a third party she should be able to recover from
her husband, even in the absence of an express contract. The normal intra-
family assumption that the services were volunteered as a gift should be rejected,
however, only when the wife has regular duties and responsibilities as an
employee and not when she lends her aid in emergencies, no matter how fre-
quent. For the tort liability of the husband to the wife, see (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 564, io8I; (1922) 32 ibid. 196.
JURISDICTION-SUIT UPON CONTRACT TO PURCHASE LAND COGNIZABLE AT
SITus.-The plaintiff brought suit in X County to cancel his contract with the
defendant for the purchase of land situated in Y County, on the ground of
fraudulent misrepresentations by the defendant. A statute (N. C. Cons. Sts.
1919, sec. 463) provided that a suit involving the determination of a right or
interest in real property must be brought in the county in which the land is
situated. Held, that the action should have been brought in Y County. Vaugkn
v. Fallin (1922, N. C.) III S. E. 513.
The common law, distinguishing between transitory and local causes of action,
requires the latter to be brought where the cause of action arises. The basis
of the rule is historical. Storke, The Venue of Actions of Trespass to Land
(1921) 27 W. VA. L. QUART. 301. Although it has been universally criticized
as being technical, illogical, and unjust, it has been followed in almost every
jurisdiction, and courts adhere to it under the doctrine of stare decisis. See
Marshall, J., in Livingston v. Jefferson (1811, C. C. D. Va.) 15 Fed. Cas. No.
8411; (1922) 2o MIcH. L. Rav. 913. In this country it is applied not only to
actions brought in one state concerning real property in another state but also
to actions brought in one county concerning real estate in another county. Only
one court has repudiated the distinction as between states (not between counties)
and permitted a recovery if the cause of action is in personam, regardless of whether
title to land is involved or not. Little v. Chicago Ry. (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67
N. W. 846. The identical result has been reached in New York by statute.
N. Y. C. C. P. sec. 982 (a), now Real Property Law, sec. 536; see Jacobus v.
Colgate (1916) 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837. Louisiana, not being bound by the
common law, does not recognize the distinction. Holmes v. Barclay (1849) 4
La. Ann. 63. It has also been abolished in a few states as between counties.
Albertsworth, Leading Developments in Procedural Reform (1922) 7 CORN. L.
QUART. 31o. The distinction should be between proceedings in rem and proceed-
ings in personam. See Lord Mansfield in Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774, K. B.)
Cowp. 161, 176; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 31.
In accordance with this view it has been held that a suit to set aside a deed
and to obtain specific performance of a contract to sell land is transitory when
the decree operates in personcam and not directly upon the land. Hayes v.
O'Brien (1894) 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73; cf. Massie v. Watts (18io, U. S.) 6
Cranch, 148, i6o; see Barbour, Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree
(1919) 17 MI H. L. REv. 527. In the instant case no real estate record was
involved, the relief sought being merely the cancellation of the fraudulently
procured contract for the purchase of land. The opposite result was reached
in a case involving similar facts and a similar statute, on the ground that the
decree would not affect title to land. State, ex rel. Barrett, v. District Court
(1905) 94 Minn. 370, 102 N. W. 869; cf. State, ex rel. Weld, v. District Court
(192o) 146 Minn. 422, 178 N. W. 1004; English v. Gibbous (1914) 79 Wash.
210, 140 Pac. 322. In view of the harshness of the rule it seems that relief
should be refused only when the decree will directly affect title to realty outside
the jurisdiction of the court.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-REGULATION OF JrrNEys.-By its charter the city
of Miami had the power "to license, control, tax, and regulate traffic and sales
upon the street." Par. H. H., sec. 3. An 6rdinance forbade the operation of
jitneys on certain streets. The plaintiff was arrested for a violation of this
ordinance and sued out a write'of habeas corpus. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the ordinance was invalid since the charter did not confer the authority
wholly to prohibit the operation of jitneys on the streets. Quigg v. State (1922,
Fla.) 93 So. 139.
Although the authority over all public streets and highways is vested in the
state legislature, it may be delegated to municipalities. Ordinances may then be
passed reasonably regulating the use of the streets. Parrish v. Richmond (1916)
119 Va. i8o, 89 S. E. 102; Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec.
1166. Thus ordinances taxing jitneys, requiring them to specify routes and
schedules, and prohibiting operation when overloaded, have been held valid.
Huston v. Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883; Dallas v. Gill (1918,
Tex. Civ. App.) 199 S. W. 1144; see (1915) 64 U. PA- L. REv. lol. No city
has exercised this power of regulation to the extent of entirely excluding jitneys
from operation, but some courts have intimated that such a power exists. See
West v. Asbury Park (1916) 89 N. J. L. 402, 99 AtI. 19o; Ex parte Dickey
(1915) 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781. Partial prohibition is reasonable regulation.
Freund, Police Power (1904) sec. 58. Thus, a municipality may refuse to grant
permits for the operation of jitneys on certain congested itreets. San Antonio
v. Feltzer (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 241--S. W. 1034; Schoenfeld v. Seattle (192o,
Wash.) 265 Fed. 726; Allen v. Bellingham (1917) 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18;
contra, Curry v. Osborne (1918) 76 Fla. 39, 79 So. 293. Or this may be done
by a confiscatory tax. Dresser v. Wichita (1915) 96 Kan. 82o, 153 Pac. 1194.
Public Service Commissions, through their ,power of regulation, may prohibit
the operation of jitneys. State v. Darazso (1922, Conn.) 118 At. 81; see Com-
MENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 183. Although the.ordinance in the instant
case prohibited jitney operation on certain streets only, the court seems to have
assumed that the prohibition was total and hence invalid. Granting that it
was, is not the power of regulation broad enough to, include absolute prohibition?
PLEADING-IMPROPER TO SPLIT CAUSE OF AcrION FOR INJURIES T0 PERSON AND
PROPERTY.-The plaintiff's person and property were injured by the defendant's
car. Having recovered a judgment for damages to his property, the plaintiff
sued for injuries to his person. Held, that the judgment in the former suit was
a bar. Fields v. Rapid Transit Co. (1922, Pa.) 117 At. 59.
A single cause of action arising either in contract or tort cannot be divided
so as to furnish bases for several suits. Secor v. Sturgis (858) 16 N. Y. 548;
Lamb v. St. Louis Ry. (1888) 33 Mo. App. 489; McKnight v. Minneapolis Ry.
(1914) 127 Minn. 27, 149 N. W. 131. The determination of what acts give
rise to a cause of action presents much difficulty. The majority view is that
although the defendant's wrongful act may result in a violation of more than
one primary right, the single act gives rise to but one cause of action. King v.
Chicago & St. Paul Ry. (igoo) go Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113; Kimball v.
Louisville & N. Ry. (1909) 94 Miss. 396, 48 So. 230; Ochs v. Public Service
Ry. (igio) 8o N. J. L. 148, 77 AtI. 533. The theory seems to be based upon
convenience rather than policy. The view of the minority, which is also the
English rule, is that no cause of action can arise unless there is a violation of
a primary right, and that each violation constitutes a -distinct chose in action.
Brunsden v. Humphrey (1884) 14 Q. B. Div. 141; Watson v. Tex. & Pac. Ry.
(1894) 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924; Reilly v. Asphalt Co. (19o2) 170
N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772. The courts adopting the latter view usually cite three
grounds for the impracticability of joining the causes of action for injuries to
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person and to property: (i) Different periods of limitation apply. (2) An
action for injury to person abates with the plaintiff's death, whereas an action
for injury to property does not. (3) Actions for injury to person are assign-
able; those for injury to property are not. Reilly v. Asphalt Co., supra. These
apparent procedural difficulties should not be troublesome in practice. The first
two are easily obviated, either by holding the statute a bar merely to so much
of the damage as would be outlawed, or, in case of death, by permitting a revival
of the action so far as it relates to property. To compel a plaintiff who has not
assigned any part of a cause of action which is partly assignable and partly not
to sue for his entire demand in a single action is no greater hardship than to
compel him to bring suit at law upon his entire demand if the whole cause of
action is assignable. It is not obvious that any difference in policy results from
the fact that the cause of action is derived from more than a single primary
right. If the injured party before suit assigns his right to damages for injury
to property the argument against permitting him to vex the defendant by two
suits does not of course apply. Underwriters at Lloyds Ins. Co. v. TractioiD
Co. (913) io6 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455. Furthermore the same witnesses must
necessarily testify as to all injuries caused by'the wrongful act. The most
desirable rule is that reached in the instant case, to settle without prejudice to
either party all issues in a minimum number of suits.
SALES-CONDITIONAL SALEs-PRIvILEGE OF VENDOR TO REPLEVY PROPERTV AFTER
SUING FOR THE PURCHASE PRcE.-The plaintiff sold a soda fountain to the
defendant under a conditional sale contract. On default of any payment all of
the purchase money notes were to become due. The vendee defaulted and the
vendor "prosecuted to verdict" an action on all of the notes remaining unpaid.
In a second action the vendor sought to replevy the soda fountain. Held, that
the plaintiff could recover. American Soda Fountain Co. v. Najarialn (1922,
Sup. Ct.) 195 N. Y. Supp. 555.
Previous to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act there were two lines of
authority as to the remedies open to a vendor for the breach of a conditional
sale contract. The more prevalent view was that the vendor might elect either
to retake the property or to sue for the purchase price; a resort to one of the
remedies barred the other. Crompton v. Beach (1892) 62 Conn. 25, 25 At. 446;
Whitney v. Abbott (i9o6) II Mass. 59, 77 N. E. 524; Francis v. Bohart (15is)
76 Or. i, 147 Pac. 755; see (1915) 13 MIcH. L. REv. 603; COMENTS (1920) 30YALE LAW JOURNAL, 742. Notwithstanding the specific agreement reserving title
in the vendor, a suit for the full purchase price was held necessarily to imply
the seller's consent to vest title in the buyer, and hence to be inconsistent with a
later attempt to replevy. But a suit for installments, other than the last, did
not fall within the rule. Schmidt v. Ackert (1p18) 231 Mass. 330, 121 N. E. 24;
Silverstin v. Kohler (I919) 18i Calif. 51, x83 Pac. 451. This theory is objection-
able. See Defiance Machine Works v. Gill (I92o) 170 Wis. 477, 175 N. W. 940.
A conditional sale agreement expressly provides that title shall not pass until
the price is paid. Under such a contract there is no logical necessity for title to
pass as a condition precedent to suit, and obtaining a judgment does not alter
this situation until the judgment is satisfied. Burdick, Sales (2d ed. igoi) Igi.
Furthermore, the title is retained essentially as security, as in the case of a sale
and a mortgage back. Steinert & Sons v. Reed (iprp) i8 Me. 403, io8 Atl.
334; Williston, Sales (i9o9) sec. 579. To require the release of the security
before suing for the debt is not in accord with good commercial practice. Under
the second line of authority the vendor might retake the property at any time
before the satisfaction of judgment, the remedies being treated as consistent and
cumulative. Wiedenbeck-Dobelin Co. v. Anderson (1918) 168 Wis. 212, i69
N. W. 615; Kirch v. La Tourette (1918) 91 N. J. L. 35, io2 Atl. 873; Johnson
v. Martin Furniture Co. (1918) 139 Tenn. 58o, 202 S. W. 916. This rule was
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applied in the instant case. Even under it, the vendor relinquishes 
his right to
the price if he retakes the chattel. Ratchford v. Cayuga County Co. (1916) 217
N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447. The recent adoption of the Uniform 
Conditional
Sales Act in New York makes a desirable advance, giving the 
vendor power to
resell the chattel when retaken and to apply the proceeds on the 
debt. Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, sec. 21; Wurlitzer v. Mandarin Co. 
(1922, Wis.) i88
N. W. 639. The Act also makes similar progress in the protection 
of the con-
ditional vendee. Secs. i8-2o.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-SuIT QuAsi IN REM--'JURISDICTIoN ACQUIRED AGAINST
NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT THROUGH CoNsTRUcTivE SERvicE.-The 
complainant,
the assignee of the vendee, sought specific performance of a contract 
for the
sale of land situated in New Jersey. The defendant, a non-resident, 
appeared
specially attacking the jurisdiction of the court. The statutes regulating service
by publication on non-residents impliedly included suits for 
specific performance.
N. J. Comp. Sts. i9po, Chancery, secs. i2-18. By another statute an equitable
decree for the conveyance of lands, not complied with by the party 
ordered to
convey, was given the same force and effect as if the conveyance 
had been
executed pursuant to the decree. N. J. Comp. Sts. igio, Chancery, sec. 45. Held,
that by reason of the statutory provisions, the suit was quasi in ren and, 
that if
there was proper service by publication, jurisdiction was acquired for a decree
valid against the non-resident defendant. McVoy v. Baumann (1922, N. J. Eq.)
117 Atl. 717.
In the absence of statutory modification a suit for specific performance
of a contract to convey realty is a proceeding in; personam and not in ren, 
and
the defendant must therefore be served personally in order to subject him to
the jurisdiction of the court. Hollingsworth v. Barbour (1830, U. S.) 4 Pet.
466. Since a state has control over all property within its limits it is within its
power, through statute, to give to such a suit the character of a suit in rein 
or
quasi in rein, so as to sustain jurisdiction on constructive service against a
non-resident. Arndt v. Griggs (i 9o) 134 U. S. 316, io Sup. Ct. 557. Under
a statute authorizing the appointment of a trustee to convey land an action 
for
specific performance of a contract against a non-resident defendant is a pro-
ceeding in rein and notice by publication is sufficient. Hollander v. Central Metal
& Supply Co. (r9o8) iog Md. 131, 71 Ati. 442; see contra, Kinkead v. Clark
(1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 239 S. W. 717; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135, note. If the
statute merely provides for service by publication without specifying the class of
actions in which it is permissible, it seems that a suit for specific performance
is not a suit in rein or quasi in rein so as to authorize constructive service. Silver
Camp Mining Co. v. Dickert (904) 31 Mont. 488, 78 Pac. 967. Where, however,
the statute expressly includes suits for specific performance constructive service
may be had. Simmons v. Fry (i8go) i9 D. C. 472; cf. Light v. Doolittle (1921,
Ind. App.) 133 N. E. 413. Frequently, as in the instant case, there is a statute
giving to decrees for conveyances effect in rem and at the same time a statute
governing service by publication which either expressly or impliedly authorizes
such service in suits for specific performance. In such cases the courts usually
sustain jurisdiction on constructive service. Clein v. Givens (I9o6) io6 Va. 145,
55 S. E. 567; Hawkins v. Doe (1912) 6o Or. 437, 1r9 Pac. 754; Light v. Doolittle,
sup ra.
ToRTS-CoNTBUToRY NEGizGENCE OF PASSENGER IN AuToMOBLE.-The defend-
ant, knowing the reckless character of his sixteen-year-old son, permitted him
to use his automobile to take a young lady to a dance. The son, driving between
5q and 60 miles an hour on a crowded thoroughfare, collided with another
machine and his companion was killed. The administrator of the deceased sued
the father. Under a plea of contributory negligence the defendant attempted to
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introduce evidence that the girl requested the driver "to get her home in a
hurry." This evidence was excluded. Held, that the testimony was properly
excluded, because it did not show that the guest had any control over the driver,
or that the request was the proximate cause of the accident. Tyree v. Tudor
(1922, N. C.) III S. E. 714.
By the great weight of authority, the negligence of the driver of an automobile
is not imputable to a guest or passenger who is riding in the machine and who
has no authority or control over the machine or the driver. White v. Carolina
Realty Co. (1921) 182 N. C. 536, 1O9 S. E. 564; L. R. A. 1915 B, 953, note. But
a passenger or guest is bound to exercise reasonable care for his own safety,
and a failure to do so constitutes contributory negligence. Winsto's Adn'r. v.
City of Henderson (1918) 179 Ky. 220, 200 C. W. 330. The care required of the
guest varies greatly with the circumstances. See (1921) 31 YArM LAw JOURNAL,
1OI. The result in the principal case is based upon the rule that a guest, to be
barred from recovery, must either have control or authority over the driver.
But the duty of the passenger to use due care for his own safety does not depend
upon principles of agency. McGeever v. O'Byrne (1919) 2o3 Ala. 266, 82 So.
5o. One riding in a motor vehicle .may be properly charged with negligence if
he encourages or permits the driver to proceed at an unreasonable speed without
remonstrance. Hardie v. Barrett (1917) 257 Pa. 42, IOI Aft. 75; Langley v. So.
Ry. (1919) 113 S. C. 45, ioi S. E. 286; Jepson v. Crosstown St. Ry. (1911,
Sup. Ct) 72 Misc. 103, 129 N. Y. Supp. 233; Howe v. Corey (192o) 172 Wis.
537, 179 N. W. 791; McGeever v. O'Byrne, supra; Huddy, Automobiles (6th ed.
1922) 912. Many recent cases even hold it to be contributory negligence on the
part of the guest who fails to warn the driver of approaching danger. Ohio
Electric Co. v. Evans (i922, Ind. App.) 134 N. E. 519; Seiffert v. Hintes (1922,
Neb.) 187 N. W. io8; Kirschbaum v. Phila. R. T. Co. (1919) 73 Pa. Super. Ct.
536; Hill v. Phila. R. T. Co. (1921) 271 Pa. 232, 114 Atl. 634- Inasmuch as
failure to object to an unreasonable rate of speed or other reckless driving con-
stitutes contributory negligence on the part of the guest so as to preclude a
recovery, it seems that the court should have admitted evidence which would.
have tended to prove, not only that the deceased acquiesced in the excessive
speeding, but apparently encouraged it.
TORTs-DSTINCTION BETWEEN ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENcE.--While the .driver of the defendant's truck was attempting to execute a
turn, the plaintiff, believing his automobile, which was parked on the opposite
side of the street, to be in danger, seized the bumper of the truck in an endeavor
to assist the driver. He was crushed between the bumper and his automobile,
and brought an action in tort for negligence. The defendant pleaded contribu-
tory negligence. Held, that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law, but that it was a question for the jury whether, under
the circumstances, his actions were reasonable. Wardrop v. Santi Moving &
Express Co. (1922, N. Y.) 135 N. E. 272.
The distinction between the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence is tenuous, and courts frequently confuse them by discussing cases
involving assumption of risk in the light of contributory negligence. Harding
v. Philadelphia Transit Co. (1907) 217 Pa. 69, 66 Atl. 151; Dixon v. N. Y., N. H.
& H. Ry. (191o) 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1O3O. Assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence are separate and distinct defenses. Knox v. American
Rolling Mill (19o8) 236 II1. 437, 86 N. E. go; George v. St. Louis & San Fran-
cisco Ry. (1910) 225 MO. 364, 125 S. W. 196. In the former case the plaintiff
voluntarily, consciously, and deliberately elects to assume the risk; contributory
negligence excludes the idea of deliberation and choice. Assumption of risk
negatives the idea of prima facie liability, whereas contributory negligence is
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an affirmative defense operating to rebut such a liability. Rase v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul, etc. Ry. (19o9) io7 Minn. 26o, 12o N. W. 36o; Bohlen, Contributory
Negligence (i9o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 245. The better view, supported by the
weight of authority, is that one may incur a reasonable danger in attempting to
save life or property without barring a right to recover. McKay v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. (1912) i6o N. C. 260, 75 S. E. io81; Wilson v. Northern Pac.
Ry. (1915) 3o N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429. There is a respectable minority to
the contrary, however, if property alone is at stake. Cook v. Johnson (1885)
58 Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 388; Hill v. East St. Louis Cotton Oil Co. (1919) 2o2
Mo. App. 478, 214 S. W. 419. Usually no error results from confusing assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence, but sometimes, where a statute bars
the former defense, the distinction becomes of vital importance. Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. (9I) 220 U. S. 590, 31 Sup. Ct. 561. The
result reached by the instant case is undoubtedly correct, but the court discusses
what appears to be a situation involving assumption of risk as though it were
contributory negligence, thus adding to the existing confusion.
TORTs-MALIciOUs INJURY OF ANOTHER IN His TaADE.-The plaintiff had for
years exploited in the columns of his newspaper the personal affairs of the
defendant, and had ridiculed the patent remedy manufactured by him. With
the avowed purpose of injuring the plaintiff, the defendant established a rival
newspaper which eventually drove the plaintiff out of business. However, the
defendant's paper continued to be published. Held, (one judge dissenting) that
the plaintiff had no cause of action. Beardsley v. Kilmer (1922, N. Y.) 200 App.
Div. 378.
It has frequently been said that the motive which actuates a person in doing
an act which he is privileged to do is immaterial, since the law deals only with
externals. Allen v. Flood [1898, H. L.] A. C. i; Passaic Print Works v. Ely
Co. (i9oo, C. C. A. 8th) io5 Fed. 163; West Va, Transp. Co. v. Standard Oil
Co. (19O2) 5o W. Va. 61i, 4o S. E. 591. There has been a decided trend, how-
ever, toward the view that motive may be of operative effect. Keeble v.
Heckeringill (17o7, K. B.) ii East, 574; Stillwater Co. v. Farmer (19o3) 89
Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 9o7; Plant v. Woods (i9oo) 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. io1i;
Bush v. Mockett (1914) 95 Neb. 552, 145 N. W. io; Ames, Tort Because of
Wrongful Motive (19o5) 18 HAxv. L. Rlv. 411. The underlying theory of such
cases is not that a bad motive added to a lawful act makes the act unlawful,
but that "prima facie the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause
of action which . . . . requires a justification if the defendant is to escape.
'
Aikens v. Wisconsin (19o4) 195 U. S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 3. The law protects
the "right to an open market" and an unjustifiable interference with that right is
an actionable wrong. Huskie v. Griffin (199o) 75 N. H. 345, 74 At. 595.
Competition in a similar kind of business is ordinarily a sufficient justification
for an injury to a man in his trade provided it does not involve the use of force
or fraud or the procuring of a breach of contract. Mogul Co. v. McGregor
[1892, H. L.] A. C. 25; Walker v. Cronin (1871) 1O7 Mass. 555. Dishonest
competition, however, which does not have for its object the advancement of
business interests, but which is engaged in solely for the purpose of crushing a
personal enemy, is not a sufficient justification for the prima facie tort. Tuttle
v. Buck (o9) 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946; Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co.
(1911) 152 Iowa, 618, 132 N. W. 371; Ames, loc. cit. The instant case can be
readily distinguished from this class of cases on its facts, for although the
defendant's purpose was to ruin the plaintiff's business, he did so from motives
of self-interest: the advertisement of his patent remedy -and the vindication of
his reputation. Furthermore his newspaper continued to be published after its
rival had failed.
